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ASSIGNMENT MAXIMIZATION
MUSTAFA OG˘UZ AFACAN, INA´CIO BO´, AND BERTAN TURHAN
Abstract. We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to
acceptable outcomes. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation
impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize as-
signments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated — in terms of number of
assignments — in equilibrium. The second are fair for unassigned students and assign
weakly more students than stable mechanisms in equilibrium. We provide comparisons
with well-known mechanisms through computer simulations. Those show that the dif-
ference in number of matched agents between the proposed mechanisms and others in
the literature is large and significant.
JEL classification: D47, C78, D63.
Keywords : Market Design, Matching, Maximal Matching, Fairness, Object Allocation,
School Choice.
1. Introduction
In discrete assignment problems, a large variety of properties have been proposed and
implemented. These include Pareto efficiency,1 various notions of fairness and stability,2
distributions of agents within schools,3 and doctors across hospitals,4 among many others.
In this paper, we consider instead the objective of maximizing the number of individuals
assigned to objects that they deem as acceptable.
This is an important and natural design objective in many practical domains, such as
school choice. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005), for example, describe the change in New
York City’s high schools’ matching program. One of the main problems identified was
that the normal process would leave a large proportion of the students unmatched, and
would end up assigning them via an administrative process to schools which were not
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necessarily among those stated in their preferences. In fact, they show that 30,000 out of
100,000 students were assigned in this way in 2002.5 Data from the New Orleans OneApp,
another centralized school choice program, show that an average of 20% of the applicants
remained unmatched after the main assignment round (Harris et al., 2015). In these
examples as well as in many others, school districts and governments don’t simply leave
students without schools while seats are left empty. Instead, additional rounds of the
school choice mechanisms and other ad-hoc administrative assignments are used to match
the remaining students. These additional rounds, however, in general eliminate many of
the incentive and fairness characteristics that justify the use of those mechanisms in the
first place (Dur and Kesten, 2014). In this paper, we start from the assumption that
the policy maker wants to minimize the number of students left unmatched, and evaluate
to what extent the usual welfare, incentive, and fairness objectives can be achieved, and
how.
Having to go through the additional processes used to assign students who are not
matched in the main process can also cause frustration and emotional stress, as shown in
the quote below:
“(...)The High School application process is a nerve wrecking nightmare and
extremely unfair to single parents, new immigrant families and any other
families who simply cannot put in the countless hours it takes to attend
Open Houses, tours and fairs. We got lucky and our daughter got into a
school of her choice, but my heart goes out to the families who have to go
through this process twice.” (Tine Kindermann) 6
From the perspective of policymakers, leaving students unassigned, even temporarily,
may have serious consequences. In 2013, for example, the city of Sa˜o Paulo (Brazil) was
ordered by a state court to pay restitution to 943 parents who had to put their children in
temporary private childcare, as a result of remaining unmatched by the city’s assignment
process.7 Maximizing the number of assignments might in fact be the primary objective of
the assignment process, as indicated by the following quote from the Frankfurt secondary
school district and North Rhine-Westphalia secondary school district:
“The organization of the “Frankfurt School Mechanism” is shared between
State, city and school. Its primary goal is to give as many applicants as
possible one of their preferred schools. Each school decides for itself which
students to admit...” (Basteck et al., 2015)
School choice is not the only practical problem where assignment maximization matters.
It is perhaps the most important objective in organ exchange programs, as evidenced by
5Even after a change in the mechanism, proposed by the authors, the number of students who remained
unmatched was still about 7,600, requiring additional elicitation of preferences over what are supposedly
undesired schools.
6Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/08/nyregion/in-applying-for-high-school-some-8th-graders-
find-a-maze.html (NYT selected comments, accessed 09/11/2017.)
7Source: http://g1.globo.com/sao-paulo/noticia/2013/05/mae-ganha-direito-de-indenizacao-apos-ficar-
sem-vaga-para-o-filho-em-creche.html (in Portuguese, accessed 09/11/2017.)
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the recent literature on those types of mechanisms. For both kidney exchange (Roth et
al., 2005) and lung exchange (Ergin et al., 2017), the objective of maximizing the number
of matchings (and therefore transplants), is put first and foremost in the design of their
mechanisms.
Another area in which maximizing the number of assignments is relevant and has raised
significant interest on the part of market designers is in the matching of asylum seekers to
countries or states. Andersson and Ehlers (2018), for example, propose an algorithm to
find maximum mutually acceptable matchings8 which are also stable. Other examples of
applications in which matching maximization is relevant include the matching of babies
to nurseries (Sasaki and Ura, 2016) and public housing.
In this study, we consider the economic problems faced by a policymaker who wants
to produce maximal matchings deterministically, when agents have strict preferences over
their outcomes. Consider the problem of assigning students to schools. The reason why
efficiency and stability (or equivalently, fairness) may conflict with maximizing the number
of matches is that some schools may be deemed unacceptable to some students. As a
result, there may be some Pareto efficient and/or stable matchings that do not maximize
assignments. Consider, for example, the case in which there are two schools (A and B),
each with only one seat, and two students (1 and 2). Student 1 only deems A as acceptable,
whereas student 2 simply prefers A to B. In this case, student 2 being matched to A and
1 remaining unmatched is a Pareto efficient assignment. Moreover, if student 2 has higher
priority at school A than student 1, that is also the unique stable assignment. Therefore,
there may typically be Pareto efficient and stable matchings that can be significantly
improved upon in terms of the number of assignments.9
We set the maximization of the number of assignments as our primary design goal. We
show that maximizing the number of assignments is incompatible not only with strategy-
proofness, but also with fairness (Proposition 1), and that no mechanism is maximal in
equilibrium (Proposition 7). While these can be interpreted as strong negative results,
we present a large set of proposals and analyses.
First, we design a family of mechanisms, denoted Efficient Assignment Maximizing
Mechanisms (EAMs), that are Pareto efficient and maximal in terms of the number of as-
signments (Theorem 1). Due to the impossibility above, EAMs are not strategy-proof, but
we characterize the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, which is Pareto efficient (Proposi-
tion 6). Moreover, EAMs are not dominated (in terms of the number of assignments) by
any other mechanism in equilibrium (Theorem 3).
While assignment maximality and fairness are incompatible, we show that a weaker
version of fairness is compatible. We say that an outcome is fair for unassigned students
if there is no situation in which an unassigned student justifiably envies the assignment
8A refugee family and a landlord are mutually acceptable if they have a language in common and the
number of beds offered by the household exceeds the number of beds needed by the refugee family.
9The efficiency cost of stability has been pointed out before in the literature. See Abdulkadiroglu and
So¨nmez (2003) and Kesten (2010).
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of some other agent. We define another family of mechanisms, denoted Fair Assignment
Maximizing mechanisms (FAMs), which maximize the number of assignments and are
fair for unassigned students (Theorem 2). Interestingly, a tradeoff between fairness and
efficiency also emerges for this weaker notion of fairness (Proposition 5). Moreover, while
EAMs are also Pareto efficient in equilibrium, we show that FAMs produce at least the
same number of assignments as the problem’s stable matchings in equilibrium (Theorem
4). We also show that, for any maximal mechanism, the induced preference-reporting
game in which some proportion of agents are truthful and non-strategic is such that, as
the number of truthful agents increases, the number of students matched in equilibrium
weakly increases (Proposition 8).
We also provide results regarding how well-known mechanisms compare in terms of the
number of assignments made. We show that there is no dominance relation between four
mechanisms used in practice and the literature (Proposition 2): Gale-Shapley Deferred
Acceptance (DA),10 Boston Mechanism (BM), Top-Trading Cycles (TTC), and Serial
Dictatorship (SD).
To test the relevance of our theoretical results and see how much EAMs/FAMs improve
upon well-known mechanisms in terms of number of assignments, we conduct a simulation
analysis comparing the number of assignments produced by five different mechanisms –
DA, BM, TTC, SD, and EAMs/FAMs. Two of the mechanisms being simulated are not
strategy-proof: BM and EAMs/FAMs. As a result, the values obtained for these simu-
lations cannot be (and are not) interpreted as outcome predictions. But they are very
informative about the impact of not considering the objective of maximizing assignments,
and also give a range for equilibrium outcomes. Simulations show that the difference be-
tween EAMs/FAMs and other mechanisms in terms of number of assignments is large and
significant. Moreover, they show that for any choice of parameters, the number of matched
students in DA, BM, TTC, and SD are very similar. Since equilibrium outcomes of AMM
are equivalent to SD (Proposition 6), that equilibrium outcomes of FAM never match less
students than stable mechanisms (Theorem 4), that equilibria of BM are stable (Ergin
and So¨nmez, 2006), and that the cardinality of the matching of equilibrium outcomes of
EAMs/FAMs increase monotonically with the number of na¨ıve students (Proposition 8),
we have the indication that also when considering incentives those simulations gives us
the range of outcomes for BM and EAMs/FAMs as well.
While for most of the remainder of the text we will frame the problems in terms of
school choice, most of our analysis applies to the general problem of producing maximal
allocations when agents have strict preferences over objects (or classes of objects) and
unit demand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed
in the next section 2, and then in section 3, we introduce the model, the mechanisms
we propose, and their properties. In section 4, we show the equilibrium behavior and
10Or any other stable mechanism.
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outcomes induced by those mechanisms, and in section 5, we present the result of computer
simulations comparing mechanisms outcomes. Proofs absent from the main text can be
found in the appendix.
2. Related Literature
While algorithms for finding maximum matchings are well-known (Kuhn, 1955; Berge,
1957), the research on the incentives induced by the use of these procedures is limited,
and typically rely on random mechanisms. One exception is Afacan and Dur (2018),
which follows-up to this paper and shows that no strategy-proof and individually rational
mechanism systematically matches more students than either of Boston, Gale-Shapley de-
ferred acceptance, and serial dictatorship mechanisms. Krysta et al. (2014) consider the
problem of producing maximal matchings in a house allocation problem. They show that
there is no mechanism that is deterministic, maximal, and strategy-proof, and provide
instead a random mechanism that is strategy-proof and yields approximately-maximal
outcomes. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2015) evaluate the trade-off between maximality
and envy-freeness, a notion of fairness that is stronger than the ones we consider in this
paper. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) consider the random assignment when agents
have dichotomous preferences. When that is the case, Pareto efficiency is equivalent
to maximality of the matching, and moreover, since agents are indifferent between all
“acceptable” allocations, maximality doesn’t result in incentive problems even in deter-
ministic mechanisms. Noda (2018) studies the matching size achieved by strategy-proof
mechanisms in a general model of matching with constraints.
Assignment maximization has been the primary objective in the organ exchange litera-
ture, as it means the maximum number of transplants. This literature was initiated by the
seminal work on kidney exchange of Roth et al. (2004). In a subsequent study, in order
to accommodate several physical and geographical restrictions in operating transplants,
Roth et al. (2005) introduce the idea of pairwise kidney exchange where exchanges can
only be made between two pairs. They suggest implementing the priority-based maximal
matching algorithm from the combinatorial optimization literature (Korte and Vygen,
2011). The first stages of both EAM and FAM are adaptations of the priority-based
maximal matching algorithm. Some other studies on organ exchanges include So¨nmez et
al. (2018), Andersson and Kratz (2018), Chun et al. (2018), Ergin et al. (2017), Nicolo´
and Rodr´ıguez-Alvarez (2017), and Ergin et al. (2018).
Refugee reassignment is another real-world application in which maximality might be
a primary design objective. Andersson and Ehlers (2018) study the problem of finding
housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. The authors propose an easy-to-
implement mechanism that finds an efficient stable maximum matching. They show that
such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of
refugees and that no unmatched refugee-landlord pair prefers each other.
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Our “fairness for unassigned students” is a weakening of the usual stability of Gale and
Shapley (1962), therefore, the current study is also related to the surging literature on the
weakening of stability in different ways. Among others, Dur et al. (2018), Afacan et al.
(2017), Morrill and Ehlers (2018), and Troyan and Kloosterman (2018) are recent papers
from that literature.
3. Model
A school choice problem consists of the following elements:
• A finite set of students I = {i1, ..., in},
• a finite set of schools S = {s1, ..., sm},
• a strict priority structure for schools = (s)s∈S where s is a linear order over
I,
• a capacity vector q = (qs1 , ..., qsm) where qs is the number of available seats at
school s,
• a profile of strict preference of students P = (Pi)i∈I , where Pi is student i’s pref-
erence relation over S ∪ {∅} and ∅ denotes the option of being unassigned. We
denote the set of all possible preferences for a student by P . Let Ri denote the
at-least-as-good-as preference relation associated with Pi, that is: sRis
′ ⇔ sPis′
or s = s
′
. A school s is acceptable to i if sPi∅, and unacceptable otherwise.
Let Ac(Pi) = {c ∈ S : cPi∅}.
In the rest of the paper, we consider the tuple (I, S,, q) as the commonly known primitive
of the problem and refer to it as the market. We suppress all those from the problem
notation and simply write P to denote the problem. A matching is a function µ : I →
S ∪ {∅} such that for any s ∈ S, |µ−1(s)| ≤ qs. A student i is assigned under µ if
µ (i) 6= ∅. For any k ∈ I ∪ S, we denote by µk the assignment of k. Let |µ| be the total
number of students assigned under µ.
A matching µ is individually rational if, for any student i ∈ I, µiRi∅. A matching µ
is non-wasteful if for any school s such that sPiµi for some student i ∈ I, |µs| = qs. A
matching µ is fair if there is no student-school pair (i, s) such that sPiµi, and for some
student j ∈ µs, i s j. A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational, non-wasteful,
and fair.
In the rest of the paper, we will consider only individually rational matchings. There-
fore, whenever we refer to a matching, unless explicitly stated, we refer to an individually
rational matching. Let M be the set of matchings.
A matching µ dominates another matching µ′ if, for any student i ∈ S, µiRiµ′i, and
for some student j, µjPjµ
′
j. A matching µ is efficient if it is not dominated by any other
matching. Note that efficiency implies both individual rationality and non-wastefulness.
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We say that a matching µ size-wise dominates another matching µ′ if |µ| > |µ′|. A
matching µ is maximal if it is not size-wise dominated.11
A mechanism ψ is a systematic way of selecting a matching for every problem, that
is, it is a function from P |I| to M. A mechanism ψ is [stable, efficient, fair, individually
rational] if, for any problem P ∈ P |I|, ψ (P ) is [stable, efficient, fair, individually rational].
A Mechanism ψ is strategy-proof if there exist no problem P , and student i with a false
preference P ′i such that ψi(P
′
i , P−i)Piψi (P ).
12
At first sight, the natural objective of a designer would be to find a mechanism that is
fair, maximal, and strategy-proof.
Proposition 1. Regarding maximal mechanisms:
(i) No fair mechanism is maximal.
(ii) No strategy-proof mechanism is maximal.
The result in item (ii) in Proposition 1 was obtained by Krysta et al. (2014). Both
items combined set the stage for the rest of the paper. Not only there is no strategy-
proof mechanism that is maximal, but even without considering incentives, there exists a
fundamental incompatibility between fairness and maximality.
Since we will focus on the number of students matched to schools, we also make use
of a method for comparing mechanisms with respect to that dimension. A mechanism
ψ size-wise dominates another mechanism φ if, for any problem P , φ (P ) does not
size-wise dominate ψ (P ), while, for some problem P ′, ψ (P ′) size-wise dominates φ (P ′).
A mechanism ψ is maximal if it is not size-wise dominated by any other mechanism.
3.1. A Size-Wise Domination Comparison Among Well-Known Mechanisms.
Here we compare well-known mechanisms in terms of the number of assigned students.
Namely, we consider the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance (DA), Top Trading Cycles
(TTC), Boston (BM), and serial dictatorship (SD) mechanisms. Their definitions are
given in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. There is no size-wise domination between any pair of mechanisms among
the DA, TTC, BM , and SD.
As a consequence of the rural hospitals theorem (Roth, 1984b), every stable matching
assigns the same number of students to schools, and so we have the following more general
result.
Corollary 1.
(i) There is no size-wise domination between any pair of mechanisms among the class of
11Notice that the notions of size domination and maximality we use is in th set of agents (or nodes)
involved in a matching. In most of the literature in graph theory, the cardinality of a matching is
measured in the set of edges of the graph that are part of the matching. While when considering the set
of edges there is a difference between maximal and maximum cardinality matchings, in our setup these
are equivalent: maximal matchings are always maximum.
12P−i is the preference profile of all students except student i.
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stable mechanisms, the TTC, the BM , and the SD.
(ii) None of stable, TTC, the BM , and SD mechanisms are maximal.
The results above take place based on the fact that some students might not rank all of
the schools as acceptable. When that is not the case, the only reason for a student to be
unassigned under these mechanisms is that all schools have been filled up, and therefore
they all assign the same number of students.
Remark 1. If every school is acceptable to every student, then DA, TTC, BM , and SD
all match the same number of students in any problem, consisting of the total sum of
schools’ capacities.
3.2. A Class of Efficient Maximal Mechanisms. In what follows, we first introduce
two concepts which will be critical to the class of mechanisms in this section.
Definition 1. A matching µ admits an improvement chain at problem P if there are
distinct students and schools {i1, ..., in, c1, c2, .., cn+1} such that |µcn+1| < qcn+1 and for
every k = 1, ..n,
(i) µik = ck,
(ii) ck+1Pikck.
Definition 2. A matching µ admits an improvement cycle in problem P if there are
distinct students and schools {i1, ..., in, c1, c2, .., cn, cn+1} such that cn+1 = c1 and for every
k = 1, ..n,
(i) µik = ck,
(ii) ck+1Pikck.
We are now ready to introduce the class of mechanisms. Given a problem P and an
enumeration of the students in I (i1, ..in),
Step 0. Let ξ0 =M.
Step 1.
Substep 1.1. Define the set ξ1 ⊆ ξ0 as follows:
ξ1 =
{
{µ ∈ ξ0 : µi1 6= ∅} If ∃µ ∈ ξ0 such that µi1 6= ∅
ξ0 otherwise
In general, for every k ≤ n,
Substep 1.k. Define the set ξk ⊆ ξk−1 as follows:
ξk =
{
{µ ∈ ξk−1 : µik 6= ∅} If ∃µ ∈ ξk−1 such that µik 6= ∅
ξk−1 otherwise
Step 1 ends with the selection of a matching µ ∈ ξn.
Step 2.
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Substep 2.1. If the matching µ does not admit an improving chain or cycle, then the
algorithm ends with the final outcome of µ. Otherwise, pick a chain or cycle, and obtain
a new matching by assigning each student in the chosen chain (cycle) to the school she
prefers in the chain (cycle), and move to the next substep.
In general:
Substep 2.k. Let µ˜ be the matching obtained in the previous round. If µ˜ does not
admit an improving chain or cycle then the algorithm ends with the final outcome of
µ˜. Otherwise, pick such a chain or cycle, and obtain a new matching by assigning each
student in the chosen chain (cycle) to the school he prefers in the chain (cycle), and move
to the next substep.
As everything is finite and, in every substep of Step 2, students are all weakly better off
with at least one being strictly better off, Step 2 terminates after finitely many substeps.
The matching obtained in the final round of Step 2 is the outcome of the algorithm.
This algorithm defines a class of mechanisms, each of which is associated with different
selections of the student ordering, the matching in the end of Step 1, and chains and cycles
in the course of Step 2. We refer to this class of mechanisms as “Efficient Assignment
Maximizing” (EAM) mechanisms.
The first step of the EAM mechanisms is a “priority mechanism”, introduced by Roth
et al. (2005) in the context of the pairwise kidney exchange problem. The authors show
that this process finds a maximal matching. Though it may seem counterintuitive that
this simple process yields a maximal matching, the intuition behind it is simple. At each
step, the set of outcomes is restricted to outcomes that will match the student being
considered to an acceptable school. Each one of these may lead to at most one other
student remaining unmatched. Therefore, following the enumeration above and trying to
match each student leads to a maximal matching.13
The matching produced, however, may not be efficient. To fix this, the second stage
implements improving chains and cycles. As these chains and cycles are welfare-improving,
the second stage preserves the maximality of the first stage outcome while benefiting the
students. Consequently, every EAM mechanism is maximal and efficient.
Theorem 1. Every EAM mechanism is maximal and efficient.
From Proposition 1, fairness and maximality are incompatible. This, along with Theo-
rem 1, implies that no EAM mechanism is fair. However, since maximality aims to assign
as many students as possible, we may be able to satisfy a weaker notion of fairness. We
say that a matching µ is fair for unassigned students if there is no student-school pair
(i, s) where µi = ∅ and i s j for some j ∈ µs. A mechanism ψ is fair for unassigned
students if, for any problem P , ψ (P ) is fair for unassigned students.
13Notice that EAM mechanisms don’t use the priorities as a constraint in the construction of the matching.
This is not uncommon when these constraints are incompatible with the main objective, which in this
case is maximality. In the context of refugee resettlement, for example, Delacre´taz and Teytelboym (2017)
argue that in that setup priorities may be safely ignored.
ASSIGNMENT MAXIMIZATION 10
Proposition 3. No EAM mechanism is fair for unassigned students.
Proof. Let I = {i, j} and S = {a, b}, each with unit capacity. Let ψ be any EAM
mechanism where the student ordering starts with i. Let the priorities be such that
a: j, i and b: i, j. Let us first consider the following preferences: Pi : a, ∅ and Pj : a, ∅.
Then, ψi (P ) = a and ψj (P ) = ∅, violating fairness for unassigned students.
Next, consider any EAM mechanism, say φ, such that the student ordering starts with
j. Let us now consider the preferences where Pi : b, ∅ and Pj : b, ∅. Then, φi (P ) = ∅ and
φj (P ) = b, violating fairness for unassigned students. 
In the next subsection we show, however, that this weaker notion of fairness is com-
patible with assignment maximization, and we provide a mechanism that produces those
outcomes.
3.3. A Class of Maximal and Fair for Unassigned Students Mechanisms. Below
is a description of how each mechanism in this class works. Given a problem P ,
Step 1. Pick an EAM mechanism ψ, and let ψ (P ) = µ.
Step 2.
Substep 2.1. If µ is fair for unassigned students then the algorithm terminates with
the final outcome of µ. Otherwise, pick a student-school pair (i, s) such that sPi∅, µi = ∅,
and i s j for some j ∈ µs. Place student i at school s, and let the lowest priority student
in µs be unassigned (note that since µ is maximal, we have |µs| = qs), while keeping
everyone else’s assignment the same. Let µ′ be the obtained matching, and move to the
next substep.
In general,
Substep 2.k. Let µ˜ be the matching obtained in the previous step. If µ˜ is fair for
unassigned students, the algorithm terminates with the outcome µ˜. Otherwise, pick a
student-school pair (i, s) such that sPi∅, µ˜i = ∅, and i s j for some j ∈ µ˜s. Place
student i at school s, and let the lowest priority student in µ˜s be unassigned, while
keeping everyone else’s assignment the same. Note that as in each substep the number
of assigned students is preserved, µ˜ is maximal. Hence, we have |µ˜s| = qs. Let µˆ be the
obtained matching, and move to the next substep.
As, in every substep, a higher priority student is placed at a school while a lower
priority one is displaced from the school, and both the students and schools are finite,
the algorithm terminates in finitely many rounds. The above procedure defines a class of
mechanisms, each of which is associated with different selections of the first stage EAM
mechanism as well as the student-school pairs in the course of Step 2. We refer to this
class of mechanisms as “Fair Assignment Maximizing” (FAM) mechanisms.
The procedure above is similar to the Deferred Acceptance with Arbitrary Input (DAAI)
in Blum et al. (1997). Its fundamental difference from our proposal is that in the second
step of a FAM , only unmatched students may fulfill their justified envies, whereas under
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the DAAI, students who are matched may also fulfill their justified envies. In fact, while
outcomes of the DAAI mechanism are always stable, outcomes of a FAM may not be.
Theorem 2. Every FAM mechanism is fair for unassigned students and maximal.
Proof. Let ψ be a FAM mechanism, and µ be the outcome of its first step. As µ is the
outcome of an EAM mechanism, and in Step 2 of ψ, no student is assigned to one of his
unacceptable choices, ψ is individually rational. Because µ is maximal and the number
of assigned students is preserved as |µ| in the course of Step 2, ψ is maximal. Moreover,
as ψ does not stop until no student-school pair violates fairness for unassigned students,
ψ is fair for unassigned students as well. 
The fair for unassigned students notion rules out priority violations of only unassigned
students. One may wonder whether we can go beyond that while keeping maximality.
The answer turns out to be very negative in the sense that if we rule out priority viola-
tions of just one particular student at one particular school, independent of the student’s
assignment, then we lose maximaliy, as formally shown below.
Proposition 4. For any student i and school s, there always exists a problem P in which
no matching µ is maximal and fair for that student-school pair in the sense that if sPiµi,
then for each j ∈ µs, j s i.
Proof. Let us consider a problem where I = {i, j} and S = {s, s′}, each with unit capacity.
Let the preferences be such that Pi : s, s
′, ∅ and Pj : s, ∅. Priorities are such that i s j.
Here, the unique maximal matching is µ where µi = s
′ and µj = s. However, sPiµi and
i s j where j ∈ µs. 
Proposition 4 reveals that in the fairness ground, we can at most achieve fairness for
unassigned students under maximality, and our FAM achieves that.
An important downside of the FAM class is the lack of efficiency, in that no FAM
mechanism is efficient. However, this is not a problem specific to the FAM class as there
exists a general incompatibility between efficiency and fair for unassigned students, as
shown below.
Proposition 5. No mechanism is efficient and fair for unassigned students.
Proof. Let I = {i, j, k} and S = {a, b}, each with unit capacity. Consider the following
preferences and priorities:
Pi : a, b, ∅; Pj : b, a, ∅; Pk : b, ∅.
a: j, i, k; b: i, k, j.
Let ψ be an efficient mechanism, and ψ (P ) = µ. By the efficiency of µ, exactly one
student is left unassigned.
Case 1. Suppose µk = ∅. Then, by efficiency of µ, µi = a and µj = b. However, as
k b j, µ cannot be fair for unassigned students.
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Case 2. Suppose µj = ∅. Then, by efficiency of µ, µi = a and µk = b. However, as
j a i, µ cannot be fair for unassigned students.
Case 3. Suppose µi = ∅. By efficiency of µ, µj = a and µk = b. However, as i b k, µ
cannot be fair for unassigned students. 
4. Incentives and Equilibrium Analysis
As shown in Proposition 1, there is no mechanism which is maximal and strategy-proof.
Hence, in particular, none of the EAM and FAM mechanisms are strategy-proof.
Corollary 2. None of the EAM and FAM mechanisms are strategy-proof.
In this section we show, however, that the mechanisms in the classes EAM and FAM
have surprisingly regular properties in terms of equilibrium outcomes. We also present
some results comparing equilibrium outcomes between mechanisms. Consider the prefer-
ence reporting game induced by a mechanism ψ. At problem P , a preference submission
P ′ = (P ′i )i∈I is a (Nash) equilibrium of ψ if for every student i, ψi (P
′)Riψi(P ′′i , P
′
−i) for
any P ′′i ∈ P . Let Ω be the set of mechanisms that admit an equilibrium in any problem
P ∈ P |I|. In the rest of this section, we consider only the mechanisms in Ω.
The first result relates to the equilibria of EAM and FAM mechanisms.
Proposition 6. Every EAM and FAM mechanism is in Ω. Moreover, for any problem,
an EAM mechanism has a unique equilibrium outcome that is equivalent to the outcome
of the serial dictatorship where the student ordering is the same as that used in that EAM
mechanism.
Proposition 6 shows, therefore, that equilibrium outcomes of EAM are not only Pareto
efficient, but will match as many students as a commonly used strategy-proof mechanism.
A mechanism ψ is maximal in equilibrium if, at any problem P and any equilibrium
submission P ′ under ψ, ψ (P ′) is maximal.
Proposition 7. No mechanism is maximal in equilibrium.
Corollary 3. No EAM and FAM mechanism is maximal in equilibrium.
Our next question is how mechanisms compare, in terms of the number of assignments,
in equilibrium. For that, we define the concept of size-wise domination in equilib-
rium.
Definition 3. For a given market (I, S,, q), a mechanism ψ size-wise dominates
another mechanism φ in equilibrium if, for any problem P and for every equilibria
P ′, P ′′ under ψ and φ, respectively |ψ (P ′)| ≥ |φ (P ′′)|, and there exists a problem P ∗ such
that for every equilibria Pˆ , P˜ under ψ and φ, respectively |ψ(Pˆ )| > |φ(P˜ )|.
What is needed, therefore, for a mechanism ψ to size-wise dominate mechanism φ in
equilibrium in a given market, is that in every problem ψ assigns at least as many students
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as φ regardless of the equilibrium selection that is made, and that there is at least one
problem in which those differences are strict.
One reason why this definition is appropriate for these comparisons is that when mech-
anisms have multiple equilibria, those may match different numbers of students, and
therefore some pairwise comparisons may go in one direction or the other. Our definition
makes sure that whether a mechanism dominates another doesn’t depend on which pair
of equilibria is being chosen, making the comparison well-defined.
Theorem 3. In any market (I, S,, q), no EAM mechanism is size-wise dominated by
an individually rational mechanism in equilibrium.
Notice that the fact that size-wise domination is defined in terms of a given market
makes Theorem 3 stronger: it is not enough to show that the result is true for a specific
market. The Theorem instead shows that for any set of students, schools, capacities
and priorities there is no individually rational mechanism that dominates any EAM in
equilibrium.
While we do not have a similar result to above for the FAM mechanisms, we are able to
compare the number of assigned students under the FAM in equilibrium and the weakly
dominant strategy equilibrium of the DA, which is truth-telling.
Theorem 4. Regarding the FAM mechanisms:
(i) For any problem P and any stable matching for P µ∗, for every equilibrium P ′ of
a FAM mechanism ψ, |ψ (P ′)| ≥ |µ∗|.
(ii) There exist a FAM mechanism ψ, problem P , and an equilibrium profile P ′ of ψ
at P such that |ψ (P ′)| > |µ∗∗|, where µ∗∗ is any stable matching for P .
One may interpret the results in this section as an indication that there isn’t much gain
in using maximal mechanisms such as EAM and FAM, since when agents respond to their
incentives, outcomes are similar to those produced by other non-maximal mechanisms.
Below we show, however, that there are improvements in terms of the cardinality of the
matching, as long as some fraction of the students are sincere.
Proposition 8. For any maximal mechanism ψ, problem P , and student i with false
preferences P ′i such that ψi(P
′
i , P−i)Piψi(P ), we have |ψ(P )| ≥ |ψ(P ′i , P−i)|. Moreover,
there exist a problem P˜ and student i with false preferences P¯i such that ψi(P¯i, P˜−i)P˜iψi(P˜ )
and |ψ(P˜ )| > |ψ(P¯i, P˜i)|.
In a preference-reporting game induced by a maximal mechanism where the only active
players are strategic students in the sense that the rest is always sincere, Proposition 8
leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Under any maximal mechanism, as the set of sincere students increases,
in any problem, the number of students matched in equilibrium either stays the same or
increases.
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Corollary 4 shows, therefore, that when using maximal mechanisms such as EAM and
FAM, the cardinality of the equilibrium outcomes is monotonically increasing in the set
of sincere students, going in the case of EAM from the outcome of SD towards maximum
matchings. These make a stronger case for the use of these mechanisms as opposed to SD
or stable mechanisms when the cardinality of the matching matters.
5. Simulations
While we have shown that the EAM family of mechanisms14 dominate any individually
rational mechanism under true preferences and that they also produce good outcomes in
equilibrium, one may wonder whether in practice the magnitude of the difference in the
actual number of students assigned justifies the proposal of a new mechanism. To provide
an answer to that question, in this section we describe and analyze simulation results in
which we compare the number of students matched under five mechanisms: EAM , DA,
BM , TTC, and SD.
The construction of the problems to be simulated follows a method similar to that
applied in Hafalir et al. (2013). Each problem contains a set of students I = {i1, . . . , in}, a
set of schools S = {s1, . . . , sm} and their capacities Q = {q1, . . . , qm}. Students have strict
preferences {Pi1 , . . . , Pin} over S ∪ {∅} and schools have strict priorities {Ps1 , . . . , Psm}
over I ∪ {∅}. Those ordinal preferences and priorities are derived from utilities that each
student and school have over the other side of the market. Let us first consider a student
i ∈ I. Her utility from being assigned to school s ∈ S is the following:
Ui (s) =
αΘs + (1− α)Θsi if αΘs + (1− α)Θsi ≥ λi−∞ otherwise
The interpretation of the parameters goes as follows. The utility that a student i
derives from being assigned to a school s is a combination of a value that is shared by
all students (Θs) and an idiosyncratic value that is unique to a student-school pair (Θsi ).
The value of Θs could therefore be the widespread understanding of the quality of the
school and Θsi incorporate, for example, the distance of the school to the student’s house
and whether the extra-curricular activities fit the student’s taste. For each problem, and
for each values of s ∈ S and (s, i) ∈ S × I, Θs and Θsi are independently drawn from the
normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1. The value of α, which represents the
correlation of preferences between students, is exogenously set in the range [0, 1].
Remark 1 showed that when every student deems every school as acceptable and no
student is unacceptable to any school, every mechanism among those being evaluated
assign the same number of students. We therefore allow for students to have outside
options and for schools to deem some students unacceptable.
14For simplicity, in this section we refer only to EAM mechanisms. Since the number of assignments is
the same under any EAM and FAM mechanism, however, unless explicitly stated, all the results below
hold for both families of mechanisms.
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Each student i has an outside option which yields utility λi. Therefore, a student would
only accept being matched to a school if the utility that she derives from that school
exceeds the value of λi.
15 The value of those outside options are also a combination of
common and idiosyncratic values:
λi = γΘ + (1− γ)Θi
For each problem and i ∈ I, Θ and Θi are independently drawn from the normal
distribution with a mean of zero and variance 1. The exogenous parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]
represents how correlated the value of the outside options are between students.
Schools’ priorities over students follow a similar model. The ordinal priorities of school
s over the students are derived from utility functions:
Us (i) =
βΘi + (1− β)Θis if βΘi + (1− β)Θis ≥ λs−∞ otherwise
Here once again, for each problem, each value of Θi and Θis is independently drawn from
the normal distribution with a mean of zero and variance 1. The concept of acceptability
here, however, is not related to the presence of some “outside option” for the school. We
interpret λs, instead, as an eligibility criterion. In exam schools, for example, it could
be a minimum exam score for admission. For schools which give distance-based priority
it could be a maximal distance requirement, and so on. For each s ∈ S, λs is drawn
independently from the normal distribution with mean λ∗ and variance 1. Therefore,
when λ∗ = −∞, no student is unacceptable to any school. Moreover, β ∈ [0, 1] is an
exogenous parameter which represents the degree of correlation between schools’ priority
rankings. Notice that the case in which students may be unacceptable to schools is not
considered in the theoretical analysis, and therefore those simulations should be taken as
an additional experiment on the outcomes of those mechanisms under true preferences.
In each simulation performed, we set the values of the parameters (n,m,Q, α, γ, β, λ∗)
and generated 100 problems, each representing different draws for values of the ran-
dom variables. More specifically, in all simulations shown below, n = 400, m = 20
and every school had capacity q = 20. Every combination of the values of the pa-
rameters α, β and γ, in steps of 0.1, were used. In other words, every (α, β, γ) ∈
[0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1]3 was simulated.
For each problem generated, we produced the matching outcome for each of the five
mechanisms : EAM, DA, BM, TTC, and SD, and recorded the number of students who
remained unassigned.16
15Although it may seem extreme to define the utility of being matched to any school with value below λi
to be −∞, that choice is inconsequential when we translate those utilities to ordinal preferences. That
is, for any i, s such that Ui (s) = −∞, it will simply be the case that school s is unacceptable to i: ∅ Pi s.
16For SD, following the principle behind the equilibrium results of EAM, the ordering of students that
was used was drawn from a uniform distribution, independently of the schools’ priorities.
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5.1. Case 1: No Student is Unacceptable to Any School. In this case we set the
value of λ∗ to be low enough such that no student is deemed unacceptable to any school.17
This is often the case in school choice problems. Figure 1 shows the median value of
the number of unmatched students across simulations, for each value of the indicated
correlation parameter.18 Two facts clearly stand out. One is that the median number
of unmatched students, for any choice of fixed parameter among α, β and γ, is very
similar between the DA, BM, TTC, and SD mechanisms. The second is how significant
the difference is in the number of unmatched students between EAM and all the other
mechanisms. When combining all the simulations performed in case 1, the DA, BM, TTC,
and SD mechanisms had a median number of unmatched students of 60 or 61, while for
EAM the value was 21, a reduction of 65% in the number of students unmatched.
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Median Number of Unmatched Students as a function of γ
Figure 1. Median Number of Unmatched Students as a function of correlation parameters
In fact, when performing two-sided T-tests testing the null hypotheses that the number
of unmatched students is the same between any two mechanisms, we are not able to reject
the null hypothesis of them being equal at the 0.01 significance level for a wide range of
parameters for the DA, BM, TTC, and SD mechanisms. That is not the case for any
17More specifically, the value of λ∗ was set to −1.797× 10308, the lowest technically possible.
18For the purpose of presentation, the graphs in this section were generated by polynomial fitting of the
simulation results.
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value of those parameters for any two-sided comparison between EAM and the other four
mechanisms. Table 5.1 shows the precise results for all combinations of two mechanisms.
The values of the median and variance of the number of students unmatched for each
mechanism and each value of α, β and γ can be found in the appendix.










α [0.0, 1.0] [0.0, 1.0]
−−−β [0.0, 1.0] [0.0, 1.0]
γ [0.0, 1.0] [0.0, 1.0]
BM
α [0.0, 0.6] ∪ [0.9, 1.0] [0.0, 0.5] ∪ [1.0] [0.0, 0.6] ∪ [0.9, 1.0]
−−−β [0.0, 1.0] [0.0, 1.0] [0.0, 1.0]
γ [0.2, 1.0] [0.5, 1.0] [0.3, 1.0]
AMM
α ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
− −−β ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
γ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 1. Ranges of values for α, β and γ for which we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the number of unassigned students is the same between
the two mechanisms, at the 0.01 significance level (Case 1)
In light of Proposition 6 and Theorem 4, which characterize the equilibrium outcome
of EAMs and establishes a lower-bound on the number of assignments in equilibrium for
FAMs, the simulation results are also informative about equilibrium results. Ergin and
So¨nmez (2006) showed that, under the assumptions that we used, every Nash equilibrium
in undominated strategies for the BM is stable and therefore have the same number of
assignments as DA.
So, to sum up, in equilibrium, EAMs have the same number of assignments as SD, BM
the same as DA, and FAMs have at least the same number as DA. The results in table 5.1
imply, therefore, that there is no statistically significant difference between equilibrium
outcomes of DA, BM, TTC, SD and AMMs, in terms of the number of assignments, for
any of the combinations of parameters considered. Moreover, those results together with
Theorem 4 do not allow us to reject the hypothesis that equilibrium outcomes of FAMs
are also indistinguishable from those outcomes as well.
5.2. Case 2: Students May be Unacceptable. In this case we set λ∗ = −1, that
is, schools may find some students unacceptable. Figure 2 shows the median value of
the number of unmatched students across simulations, for each value of the indicated
correlation parameter.
Similarly to case 1, EAM mechanisms perform significantly better than all other mech-
anisms in terms of the number of students matched, in all configurations of parameters
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SD DA TTC BM EAM
Median Number of Unmatched Students as a function of γ
Figure 2. Median Number of Unmatched Students as a function of correlation parameters
evaluated. When combining all the simulations performed in case 2, the mechanisms had
more distinct performances, with SD, DA, TTC, BM, and EAM having a median num-
ber of unmatched students 77, 91, 91, 85, 32, respectively. Table 2 shows, for each pair
of distinct mechanisms, the ranges of values for α, β and γ for which we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the number of unassigned students is the same between the two
mechanisms at the 0.01 significance level.
The values of the median and variance of the number of students unmatched for each
mechanism and each value of α, β and γ can be found in the appendix.
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− −−β [0.0, 0.3]
γ ∅
TTC
α ∅ [0.4, 1.0]
−−−β [0.0, 0.2] [0.0, 1.0]
γ ∅ [0.0, 1.0]
BM
α [0.7, 0.8] [0.1, 0.3] ∪ [1.0] [1.0]
−−−β [0.0, 0.3] [0.0, 0.5] [0.0, 0.3]
γ ∅ [0.6, 1.0] [0.9, 1.0]
AMM
α ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
− −−β ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
γ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 2. Ranges of values for α, β and γ for which we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the number of unassigned students is the same between
the two mechanisms at the 0.01 significance level (Case 2)
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The Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (DA). Step 1. Each student applies to her favorite
acceptable school. Each school tentatively accepts the students among its applicants one
at a time following its priority order up to its capacity, and rejects the rest.
In general,
Step k. Each rejected student in the previous step applies to her next favorite acceptable
school. Each school tentatively accepts the students among its current step applicants
and the tentatively accepted ones in the previous step one at a time following its priority
order, and rejects the rest.
The algorithm terminates whenever any student is tentatively accepted by a school or
has all acceptable applications rejected. The tentative assignments in the terminal step
become the final DA assignments.
The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTC). Step 1. Each student points to her favorite
acceptable school. Each school points to the highest priority student. As both the sets of
students and schools are finite, there exists a cycle. Assign each student in a cycle to the
school he is pointing to, and decrease the capacity of each school appearing in a cycle by
one.
In general,
Step k. Each unassigned student points to her favorite acceptable school with remain-
ing capacity. Each school with an empty seat points to the highest priority unassigned
student. As there are finitely many unassigned students and schools with remaining ca-
pacity, there exists a cycle. Assign each student in a cycle to the school he is pointing to,
and decrease the remaining capacity of each school appearing in a cycle by one.
The algorithm terminates whenever any student is assigned or all of his acceptable
schools exhaust their capacities.
Boston Mechanism (BM). Step 1. Each student applies to her best acceptable school.
Each school permanently accepts the students among its applicants one at a time following
its priority order up to its capacity, and rejects the rest.
In general,
Step k. Each rejected student applies to her next best acceptable school. Each school
with remaining capacity permanently accepts the students among its current step appli-
cants one at a time following its priority order up to its remaining capacity, and rejects
the rest.
The algorithm terminates whenever any student is assigned or all of his acceptable
schools exhaust their capacities.
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Serial Dictatorship (SD). Step 0. Enumerate the students I = {i1, .., in}.
Step 1. Start with the first student i1, and let him choose his top acceptable school with
an available seat. Decrease the capacity of his assigned school by one while keeping the
capacity of every other school the same. If there is no acceptable school with an available
seat, then leave him unassigned.
In general,
Step k. Let student ik choose his top acceptable school among those with an available
seat. Decrease the capacity of his assigned school by one while keeping the capacity of
every other school the same. If there is no acceptable school with an available seat then
leave him unassigned.
The algorithm terminates by the end of Step n. The above description indeed defines
a class of mechanisms, each member of which is associated with a different enumeration
in Step 0. We call any mechanism in this class serial dictatorship (SD).
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Proofs.
Proposition 1. (i). Let ψ be a fair mechanism. Consider a problem where I = {i, j} and
S = {a, b}, each with unit capacity. Let the preferences and priorities be as follows:
Pi : a, b, ∅; Pj : a, ∅.
a=b= i, j.
The unique maximal matching is µ′ where µ′i = b and µ
′
j = a. However, µ
′ is not fair,
showing that no fair mechanism is maximal.
(ii). Assume for a contradiction that ψ is a strategy-proof and maximal mechanism.
Consider a problem where I = {i, j} and S = {a, b}, each with unit capacity. Let the
priorities be such that a=b: i, j. Consider the problem P where Pi : a, b, ∅ and
Pj : a, ∅.
As ψ is maximal, ψi (P ) = b and ψj (P ) = a. Let P
′
i : a, ∅ and P ′ = (P ′i , Pj). Due
to the strategy-proofness of ψ, ψi (P
′) = ∅ and ψj (P ′) = a. The latter is because ψ is
maximal.
Let us now consider P ′′j : a, b, ∅ and P ′′ = (P ′i , P ′′j ). As ψ is maximal, ψi (P ′′) =
a and ψj (P
′′) = b. This, along with the fact that ψj (P ′) = a, implies that student
j profitably reports false preferences P ′j whenever the true preferences are P
′′. This,
however, contradicts the strategy-proofness of ψ, which finishes the proof.
Proposition 2. Let us consider a problem consisting of I = {i, j, k} and S = {a, b, c}, each
with unit capacity. Let the preferences and priorities be as follows:
Pi : a, ∅; Pj : a, b, c, ∅; Pk : b, a, c, ∅.
a: k, j, i; b: i, j, k; c: j, i, k.
In the above problem, the DA and BM produce the same matching, say µ, and it is
such that µi = ∅, µj = a, and µk = b. That is, |µ| = 2. On the other hand, the TTC
outcome, say µ′, is such that µ′i = a, µ
′
j = c, and µ
′
k = b. That is, |µ′| = 3. Hence, neither
the DA nor the BM dominate the TTC.
Let us now consider I = {i, j, k, h} and S = {a, b, c, d}, each with unit capacity. Let
the preferences and priorities be as follows:
Pi : a, b, ∅; Pj : a, ∅; Pk : d, b, c, ∅; Ph : d, ∅.
a: k, j, i; b: i, j, k; c: j, i, k; d: h, i, j, k.
The DA and BM outcomes are the same, say µ, where µi = b, µj = a, µk = c, and
µh = d. On the other hand, the TTC outcome, say µ
′, is such that µ′i = a, µ
′
j = ∅, µ′k = b,
and µ′h = d. Hence, |µ| > |µ′|, showing that the TTC does not dominate either of the
DA and the BM .
For the non-existence of a domination relation between the DA and the BM , consider
I = {i, j, k} and S = {a, b, c}, each with unit capacity. Let the preferences and priorities
be as follows:
Pi : a, c, ∅; Pj : b, a, ∅; Pk : b, ∅.
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a: k, j, i; b: k, i, j; c: j, i, k.
In the above problem, the DA outcome, say µ, is such that µi = c, µj = a, and
µk = b. On the other hand, the BM outcome, say µ
′, is such that µ′i = a, µ
′
j = ∅, and
µ′k = b. Hence, |µ| > |µ′|, showing that the BM does not dominate the DA. Next, for
the converse, consider the following preferences and priorities:
Pi : b, a, c, ∅; Pj : a, ∅; Pk : b, ∅.
a: k, i, j; b: k, i, j; c: j, i, k.
In the above problem, the DA outcome, say µ, is such that µi = a, µj = ∅, and µk = b.
On the other hand, the BM outcome, say µ′, is such that µ′i = c, µ
′
j = a, and µ
′
k = b.
Hence, |µ| < |µ′|, showing that the DA does not dominate the BM . This finishes the
proof.
For the non-existence of a domination relation between the SD and the other mecha-
nisms, consider I = {i, j} and S = {a, b}, each with unit capacity. Let the preferences
and priorities be as follows:
Pi : a, b; Pj : a, ∅.
a: j, i; b: j, i.
Let us consider the SD mechanism where student i comes first in the student ordering.
Then, the SD outcome µ is such that µi = a and µj = ∅. On the other hand, all the DA,
TTC, and BM outcomes are the same, say µ′, and it is such that µ′i = b and µ
′
j = a.
Hence, the SD mechanism does not size-wise dominate the DA, TTC, and BM .
Let us now consider the following preferences, with the same priorities as above.
Pi : a, ∅, Pj : a, b, ∅.
At the above problem, the SD outcome µ is such that µi = a and µj = b. All the DA,
TTC, and BM outcomes are the same, say µ′, and it is such that µ′i = ∅ and µ′j = a.
Hence, none of DA, TTC, and BM size-wise dominate the SD mechanism.
In the above market, the symmetric arguments easily show that there is no size-wise
domination relation between the other SD mechanism where student j comes first, and
the other mechanisms. This finishes the proof.
Theorem 1. We will use the following Lemma:
Lemma. A maximal matching µ is efficient if and only if it does not admit an improving
chain or cycle.
Proof. “Only If” Part. Let µ be an efficient matching. If it admits an improving chain
{i1, ..in, c1, .., cn+1}, then we can define a new matching by assigning each agent ik to ck+1
while keeping the assignments of the others the same. By the improving chain definition,
that new matching dominates µ, contradicting our starting supposition that µ is efficient.
The same argument shows for the case of improving cycle.
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“If” Part. Let µ be a maximal matching such that it does not admit an improving
chain or cycle. We want to show that it is efficient. Assume for a contradiction that there
exists a matching µ′ that dominates µ.
Let W = {i ∈ I : µ′iPiµi}. By the supposition, W 6= ∅. Note that for any student i
with µi 6= ∅, we have µ′i 6= ∅. This, along with the maximality of µ, implies that |µ′| = |µ|.
Hence, for any student i with µi = ∅, µ′i = ∅.
Let us enumerate the students in W = {i1, .., in} and write µ′ik = ck for any k = 1, .., n.
If |µck | < qck for some k, then the pair {ik, ck} would constitute an improving chain, which
would yield a contradiction.
Let us suppose that |µck | = qck for any k = 1, .., n. As school c1 does not have excess
capacity at µ, and µ′i1 = c1, we have another student in W , say i2, such that µi2 = c1.




we have another student in W , say i3, such that µi3 = c2. If we continue to apply the
same arguments to the other students in W , as W is finite, we would eventually obtain
an improving cycle, which yields a contradiction. 
We can now proceed to the proof of the Theorem. Let ψ be an EAM mechanism, and
µ and µ′ be its first stage and final outcome, respectively. As students are not assigned to
one of their unacceptable schools in the course of Step 1 of ψ, µ is individually rational.
We next show that µ is maximal. Assume for a contradiction that it is not maximal.
This means that there exists another matching µ′′ 6= µ such that |µ′′| > |µ|. Let {i1, .., in}
be the agent-enumeration that is used under ψ.
As |µ′′| > |µ|, there exists some agent ik ∈ I such that µ′′ik 6= ∅ and µik = ∅. Let ik′ be the
first agent according to the above enumeration such that µ′′ik′ 6= ∅ and µik′ = ∅. This means
that for each k < k′, either µik 6= ∅ or µik = ∅ and µ′′ik = ∅. LetB(µ, k′) = {i ∈ N : µik 6= ∅
for any k < k′}. That is, it is set of agents who come before agent ik′ in the above
enumeration and are assigned under matching µ.
Let us now consider agent ik′ . By the definition of ψ, µik′ = ∅ because it is not possible
to match agent ik′ to some of his acceptable objects while keeping all the agents in B(µ, k
′)
assigned to one of their acceptable objects. This means that in order for agent ik′ to receive
one of his acceptable objects, one of the assigned agents under µ from B(µ, k′) has to be
unassigned. This arguments holds for each other agent who is assigned under µ′′, but not
under µ. This implies that µ is maximal.
In Step 2 of ψ, new matchings are obtained by implementing improving chains and
cycles (if any). By their definitions, in the course of Step 2, no student receives a worse
school than his assignment µ. This, along with the individual rationality of µ, implies
that µ′ is maximal. The efficiency of µ′ directly comes from the Lemma above.
Proposition 6. Let ψ be an EAM mechanism. By its definition, the first student in
the ordering in Step 0 of the EAM obtains his top choice by reporting it as the only
acceptable choice, irrespective of the other students’ preference submissions. By the same
reasoning, the second student in the ordering can obtain his top choice among the schools
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with available seats (after the capacity of the first student assignment is decreased by one)
by reporting that school as his only acceptable choice, irrespective of the other students’
preference submissions. Once we repeat the same arguments for every other student, we
not only find an equilibrium of ψ, but also conclude that it is the unique equilibrium
outcome, which coincides with the outcome of serial dictatorship with the ordering as the
same as that in Step 0 of ψ.
Let φ be a FAM mechanism. Let µ be a stable matching at P . Consider the preferences
submission P ′ under which for any student i, the only acceptable school is µi. Any
unassigned student at µ reports no school acceptable at P ′. It is easy to verify that
φ (P ′) = µ.
Next, we claim that P ′ is an equilibrium submission under φ. Suppose for a contra-










−i) = s and φi (P
′) = s′. As µ is stable, |µs| = qs. This, along with
the definition of P ′ and φi(P ′′i , P
′
−i) = s, implies that there exists a student j 6= i such




−i) = ∅. Moreover, from the stability of µ, we also have j s i.
These altogether contradict the fairness for unassigned students of φ, showing that P ′ is
equilibrium of φ.
Proposition 7. Let I = {i, j} and S = {a, b}, each with unit capacity. Assume for a
contradiction that ψ ∈ Ω such that it is maximal in equilibrium.
Consider the preferences where Pi : a, ∅ and Pj : a, b, ∅. In any equilibrium at P , ψ
places student i and student j at school a and b, respectively.
Consider the problem P ′ where P ′i : a, ∅ and P ′j : a, ∅. If there exists an equilibrium of
ψ at P ′ under which student j is assigned to school a, then this submission constitutes
an equilibrium at P as well. This, however, contradicts ψ being maximal in equilibrium.
Hence, under any equilibrium at P ′, student i is assigned to school a while student j is
unassigned.
Let us now consider the problem P ′′ where P ′′i : a, b, ∅ and P ′′j = P ′j : a, ∅. As ψ is
maximal in equilibrium, under any equilibrium at P ′′, student i and student j have to be
placed at school b and school a, respectively.
We next claim that any equilibrium at P ′ is also an equilibrium at P ′′. To see this, let
P˜ be equilibrium at P ′. As ψ is maximal in equilibrium, either of agents has to receive
object a at ψ(P˜ ). Without loss of generality, let us assume that agent i receives object a
at ψ(P˜ ). This automatically implies that ψj(P˜ ) = ∅. But then, because P˜ is equilibrium
under ψ at problem P ′, for no preference P¯j ∈ P , ψj(P˜i, P¯j) = a. From here, we conclude
that P˜ is equilibrium of ψ at problem P ′′ as well.
The above analysis shows that there exists an equilibrium at P ′′ under which student
i is assigned to school a, and student j is unassigned. This, however, contradicts ψ being
maximal in equilibrium, finishing the proof.
Theorem 3. In the proof, we will use the following lemma.
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Lemma. Let ψ be an EAM and φ be an individually rational mechanism. In any market
(I, S,, q) and problem P , if |ψ (P ′)| < |φ (P ′′) | where P ′ and P ′′ are equilibria under ψ
and φ, respectively, then there exists a student i such that ψi (P
′)Piφi (P ′′)Pi∅.
Proof. In a market (I, S,, q) and problem P , let |ψ (P ′)| < |φ (P ′′) | where P ′ and P ′′
are equilibria under ψ and φ, respectively. This implies that for some school s, |ψs (P ′)| <
|φs (P ′′)| ≤ qs. Hence, let i ∈ φs (P ′′) \ ψs (P ′). By the individual rationality of φ
and P ′′ being equilibrium under φ, we have sPi∅, where φi (P ′′) = s. As the unique
equilibrium outcome of ψ coincides with the (truthtelling) outcome of a SD mechanism
(Proposition 5), we have ψ (P ′) = SD (P ). Hence, school s has an excess capacity under
SD (P ). Moreover, from above, ψi (P
′) = SDi (P ) 6= s. Hence, by the non-wastefulness
of SD, i must be matched to a school strictly better than s and therefore ψi (P
′) =
SDi (P )Piφi (P
′′)Pi∅, which finishes the proof. 
Let now (I, S,, q) be a market and ψ be an EAM mechanism. Assume for a contra-
diction that an individually rational mechanism φ size-wise dominates ψ in equilibrium.
This in particular implies that for some problem P , |ψ (P ′)| < |φ (P ′′) | for every equilibria
P ′ and P ′′ under ψ and φ, respectively. In what follows, we will fix one such pair P ′, P ′′.
We prove the result in two steps.
Step 1. By the Lemma above, there exists a student i such that ψi (P
′)Piφi (P ′′)Pi∅.
Let P¯i be the preference relation that keeps the relative rankings of the schools the same
as under Pi, while reporting any school that is worse than ψi (P
′) as unacceptable. In
other words, P¯i truncates Pi below ψi (P
′). Let us write P¯ = (P¯i, P−i). Recall that the
unique equilibrium outcome of ψ always coincides with the truthtelling outcome of a SD
mechanism (Proposition 5). Moreover, by the construction of P¯ , SD (P ) = SD(P¯ ). This




for every equilibrium P¯ ′ under ψ in problem P¯ .









for some equilibria P¯ ′ and P¯ ′′ under ψ and φ, respectively, then we move to Step 2.
Otherwise, we pick such student j. Note that because of the definition of P¯i states













P¯j∅ cannot hold for j = i, therefore j 6= i. Then, as the same as




. Let us write





rium P˜ ′ under ψ in problem P˜ .









for some equilibria P˜ ′ and P˜ ′′ under ψ and φ, respectively, then we move to Step 2. Oth-
erwise, we pick such a student k. By the same reason as above, student k is different than
both i and j. Then, we follow the same arguments above and obtain a new preference
profile. In each iteration, we have to consider a different student. But then, since there
are finitely many students, this case cannot hold forever. Hence, we eventually obtain a







some equilibria Pˆ ′ and Pˆ ′′ under ψ and φ, respectively, and move to Step 2. We also have
ψ (P ′) = ψ(Pˆ ′) for any equilibrium Pˆ ′ under ψ in problem Pˆ .
Step 2. By the Lemma above, in problem Pˆ , we have
∣∣∣ψ (Pˆ ′)∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣φ(Pˆ ′′)∣∣∣ for any
equilibria Pˆ ′ and Pˆ ′′ under ψ and φ, respectively. If it holds strictly for some equilibria,
then we reach a contradiction. Suppose
∣∣∣ψ(Pˆ ′)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣φ(Pˆ ′′)∣∣∣ for any equilibria Pˆ ′ and Pˆ ′′.
We now claim that Pˆ ′′ is an equilibrium under φ in problem P . Suppose it is not, and let
student k have a profitable deviation, say P¨k, from Pˆ
′′






















, contradicting Pˆ ′′ being an equilibrium under φ in problem
Pˆ .
Recall that ψ (P ′) = ψ(Pˆ ′). Hence, this, along with
∣∣∣ψ(Pˆ ′)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣φ(Pˆ ′′)∣∣∣ and our above
finding, implies that in problem P , |ψ (P ′)| =
∣∣∣φ(Pˆ ′′)∣∣∣ where P ′ and Pˆ ′′ are equilibria
under ψ and φ, respectively. Therefore, we constructed an equilibrium pair for problem
P where ψ matches as many students as φ, contradicting our assumption that this does
not hold in problem P .
Theorem 4. (i). First, by the rural hospital theorem (Roth, 1984b), the number of assign-
ments in any stable matching is the same as that of DA. Let ψ be a FAM mechanism.
Assume for a contradiction that there exist a problem P and an equilibrium profile P ′ un-
der ψ such that |ψ (P ′)| < |DA (P ) |. For ease of writing, let DA (P ) = µ and ψ (P ′) = µ′.
We now claim that for some student i, µi = s for some school s whereas µ
′
i = ∅ and,
moreover, |µ′s| < qs. To prove this claim, let us define W = {i ∈ I : µi = s and µ′i = ∅}.
By our supposition that |DA (P ) | > |ψ (P ′)|, we have W 6= ∅. Suppose that for each
i ∈ W with µi = s, |µ′s| = qs. But then this implies that |µ′| ≥ |µ|, contradicting our
initial supposition, which finishes the proof of the claim.




P ′k If k 6= i
s, ∅ If k = i
First, observe that there exists a (individually rational) matching at P ′′ that assigns
|µ′|+ 1 many students (to see this, keep the assignment of everyone except student i the
same as at µ′, and place student i at school s). Therefore, due to the maximality of ψ, we
have |ψ (P ′′)| ≥ |µ′|+1. If student i is assigned to school s at ψ (P ′′) then this contradicts
P ′ being equilibrium under ψ. Hence, ψi (P ′′) = ∅. But then, by the definition of P ′′,
ψ (P ′′) is individually rational at P ′. This, along with the maximality of ψ, implies that
|ψ (P ′)| ≥ |ψ (P ′′)|, contradicting our previous finding that |ψ (P ′′)| ≥ |ψ (P ′)|+ 1, which
finishes the proof of the first part.
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(ii). Let us consider I = {i, j, k, h} and S = {a, b, c}, each with unit capacity. The
preferences and the priorities are given below.
Pi : a, b, ∅; Pj : c, a, ∅; Pk : c, a, ∅; Ph : c, ∅.
a: k, i, j, h; b: k, h, j, i; c: k, h, i, j.
Let ψ be a FAM mechanism with the student ordering k, j, i, h. Mechanism ψ is such
that it produces matching µ at P where µi = b, µj = a, µk = c, and µh = ∅. For
any P ′i ∈ P with bP ′i∅, let ψ(P ′i , P−i) = µ′ where µ′i = b, µ′j = ∅, µ′k = a, and µ′h = c.
Moreover, for any P ′i ∈ P with ∅P ′i b, ψ(P ′i , P−i) = µ′′ where µ′′i = ∅, µ′′j = ∅, µ′′k = a, and
µ′′h = c. And, for any P
′
h ∈ P , let ψ(P−h, P ′h) = µ.
Note that student j can never get school c under ψ by misreporting because otherwise
student h would be unassigned, and he has higher priority at school c. It is immediate to
see that the above matchings can be obtained in the course of FAM through particular
selection. All of these show that under ψ, truth-telling is an equilibrium at P , and
|ψ (P ) | = 3. On the other hand, DA (P ) is such that DAi (P ) = a, DAk (P ) = c, and
DAh (P ) = DAj (P ) = ∅. Hence, |ψ (P ) | > |DA (P ) |, finishing the proof of the second
part.
Proposition 8. Let P ′ = (P ′i , P−i), ψ(P ) = µ, and ψ(P
′
i , P−i) = µ
′. Assume for a contra-
diction that |µ′| > |µ|. By our supposition, µ′iPiµi. This, along with the fact that Pj = P ′j
for each j 6= i, µ′ is individually rational in problem P . But then, |µ′| > |µ| contradicts
the fact that µ is maximal in problem P .
Let us now consider a problem where {i, j} ⊆ N , {a, b} ⊆ S, each with unit capacity.
Let the preferences be such that Pi : a, ∅, Pj : a, ∅, and each other student (if any) finds
any school unacceptable. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the outcome of ψ
in that problem, say µ, is such that µi = a, and each other student is unassigned.
Let us next consider problem where P ′i : a, b, ∅, while each other student’s preferences
are the same as above. Under the true preferences here, ψ produces µ′ where µ′i = b, µ
′
j =
a, and each other student is unassigned. However, student i can beneficially misreport
his preferences by submitting Pi above as, under this false profile, ψ produces matching
µ above. Finally, note that |µ′| > |µ|, finishing the proof.
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Simulation results.
α SD DA TTC BM AMM
0.0 8 (28.49) 7 (28.65) 8 (28.5) 8 (28.41) 3 (28.55)
0.1 11 (32.93) 11 (33.13) 11 (32.92) 12 (32.79) 5 (32.85)
0.2 20 (41.86) 20 (42.17) 20 (41.87) 21 (41.68) 7 (41.06)
0.3 34 (50.85) 34 (51.19) 34 (50.84) 34 (50.56) 10 (49.18)
0.4 51 (57.47) 51 (57.82) 51 (57.46) 50 (57.14) 14 (55.81)
0.5 71 (65.87) 72 (66.14) 71 (65.88) 69 (65.58) 20 (66.31)
0.6 91 (71.85) 93 (71.99) 91 (71.88) 88 (71.71) 26 (76.3)
0.7 112 (75.68) 115 (75.64) 112 (75.68) 107 (75.71) 36 (84.76)
0.8 130 (76.52) 133 (76.31) 130 (76.47) 126 (76.66) 52 (89.18)
0.9 144 (76.96) 145 (76.81) 144 (76.95) 141 (77.12) 68 (92.52)
1.0 152 (75.82) 152 (75.85) 152 (75.85) 152 (75.85) 81 (92.84)
Table 3. Median and standard deviation for the number of unmatched
students, varying α from 0.0 to 1.0 (Case 1)
β SD DA TTC BM AMM
0.0 61.0 (81.28) 63.0 (82.22) 61.0 (81.3) 60.0 (80.69) 21.0 (76.73)
0.1 61.0 (80.11) 63.0 (81.11) 61.0 (80.16) 60.0 (79.53) 21.0 (75.38)
0.2 60.0 (80.31) 62.0 (81.21) 60.0 (80.3) 59.0 (79.68) 21.0 (75.25)
0.3 61.5 (81.42) 63.0 (82.17) 61.0 (81.39) 60.0 (80.8) 22.0 (76.9)
0.4 61.0 (81.67) 62.0 (82.32) 61.0 (81.66) 60.0 (81.03) 21.0 (77.28)
0.5 60.0 (80.08) 60.0 (80.59) 60.0 (80.07) 59.0 (79.46) 20.0 (75.22)
0.6 60.0 (80.89) 61.0 (81.22) 60.0 (80.88) 59.0 (80.3) 21.0 (76.42)
0.7 60.0 (80.57) 60.0 (80.77) 60.0 (80.57) 59.0 (79.95) 21.0 (75.95)
0.8 60.0 (80.13) 60.0 (80.22) 60.0 (80.13) 59.0 (79.53) 21.0 (75.38)
0.9 60.0 (80.4) 60.0 (80.44) 60.0 (80.41) 60.0 (79.82) 21.0 (75.77)
1.0 62.0 (82.15) 62.0 (82.14) 62.0 (82.14) 60.0 (81.55) 22.0 (77.85)
Table 4. Median and standard deviation for the number of unmatched
students, varying β from 0.0 to 1.0 (Case 1)
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γ SD DA TTC BM AMM
0.0 86.0 (47.46) 88.0 (48.12) 86.0 (47.49) 83.0 (46.52) 36.0 (20.18)
0.1 81.0 (49.51) 83.0 (50.19) 81.0 (49.55) 78.0 (48.51) 29.0 (21.78)
0.2 73.0 (53.1) 76.0 (53.76) 73.0 (53.09) 71.0 (52.13) 22.0 (27.64)
0.3 68.0 (57.83) 69.0 (58.48) 67.0 (57.85) 65.0 (56.85) 17.0 (36.49)
0.4 60.0 (63.05) 62.0 (63.63) 60.0 (63.02) 59.0 (62.03) 13.0 (45.51)
0.5 53.0 (70.3) 54.0 (70.93) 53.0 (70.29) 52.0 (69.38) 10.0 (58.25)
0.6 49.0 (79.21) 49.0 (79.77) 48.0 (79.15) 48.0 (78.35) 9.0 (71.71)
0.7 45.0 (89.01) 45.0 (89.54) 45.0 (89.0) 45.0 (88.31) 10.0 (86.04)
0.8 41.0 (101.12) 40.0 (101.66) 41.0 (101.13) 41.5 (100.61) 12.0 (101.22)
0.9 40.0 (110.93) 39.0 (111.43) 40.0 (110.94) 41.0 (110.51) 15.0 (113.0)
1.0 40.0 (120.95) 39.0 (121.41) 40.0 (120.94) 40.0 (120.54) 17.0 (123.78)
Table 5. Median and standard deviation for the number of unmatched
students, varying γ from 0.0 to 1.0 (Case 1)
Case 1: No student is unacceptable to any school.
α SD DA TTC BM AMM
0.0 35 (32.29) 44 (35.9) 49 (34.26) 46 (32.99) 13 (33.26)
0.1 38 (38.43) 48 (40.8) 52 (39.22) 49 (38.4) 16 (40.12)
0.2 43 (44.95) 54 (46.15) 57 (44.71) 53 (44.27) 18 (46.55)
0.3 54 (53.29) 65 (53.13) 66 (51.85) 62 (51.93) 21 (54.53)
0.4 68 (60.06) 78 (58.78) 79 (57.7) 74 (58.2) 25 (61.98)
0.5 85 (65.82) 95 (63.75) 94 (62.92) 88 (63.76) 30 (69.18)
0.6 104 (71.33) 113 (68.62) 112 (68.08) 105 (69.41) 38 (78.28)
0.7 121 (74.43) 130 (71.38) 128 (71.15) 121 (72.62) 48 (84.72)
0.8 137 (74.87) 145 (71.72) 143 (71.65) 137 (73.14) 62 (88.18)
0.9 149 (75.16) 156 (72.12) 156 (72.11) 152 (73.18) 79 (91.14)
1.0 155 (74.32) 161 (71.58) 161 (71.58) 161 (71.58) 90 (90.68)
Table 6. Median and standard deviation for the number of unmatched
students, varying α from 0.0 to 1.0 (Case 2)
ASSIGNMENT MAXIMIZATION 34
β SD DA TTC BM AMM
0.0 73 (77.73) 73 (79.29) 73 (77.36) 72 (76.55) 30 (77.02)
0.1 75 (77.36) 76 (78.89) 76 (76.89) 74 (76.19) 30 (77.02)
0.2 73 (77.85) 75 (78.97) 75 (76.89) 73 (76.47) 30 (77.82)
0.3 74 (78.05) 77 (78.58) 78 (76.33) 75 (76.37) 31 (78.26)
0.4 75 (75.7) 80 (75.24) 81 (73.1) 77 (73.55) 31 (75.9)
0.5 76 (77.95) 83 (75.98) 85 (74.03) 80 (75.04) 31 (78.78)
0.6 78 (75.93) 89 (72.36) 90 (70.86) 84 (72.24) 32 (77.14)
0.7 79 (75.45) 95 (70.05) 96 (69.09) 89 (70.87) 32 (76.94)
0.8 80 (74.65) 100 (67.84) 101 (67.37) 92 (69.41) 32 (76.76)
0.9 82 (74.47) 105 (66.57) 105 (66.45) 96 (68.71) 34 (76.87)
1.0 84 (74.9) 108 (66.4) 108 (66.4) 99 (68.69) 36 (77.65)
Table 7. Median and standard deviation for the number of unmatched
students, varying β from 0.0 to 1.0 (Case 2)
γ SD DA TTC BM AMM
0.0 99.0 (42.3) 108.0 (42.4) 106.0 (41.52) 100.0 (40.95) 45.0 (21.06)
0.1 93.0 (44.3) 103.0 (44.46) 102.0 (43.42) 95.0 (42.82) 37.0 (24.0)
0.2 87.0 (47.8) 98.0 (47.72) 98.0 (46.52) 91.0 (45.91) 31.0 (29.75)
0.3 82.0 (52.92) 94.0 (52.47) 93.0 (51.1) 87.0 (50.73) 27.0 (39.01)
0.4 76.0 (58.68) 90.0 (58.06) 90.0 (56.53) 84.0 (56.27) 23.0 (49.05)
0.5 71.0 (66.66) 85.0 (65.49) 86.0 (63.82) 80.0 (63.78) 21.0 (61.25)
0.6 67.0 (75.38) 83.0 (73.8) 84.0 (72.01) 78.0 (72.28) 21.0 (74.42)
0.7 65.5 (85.64) 82.0 (83.49) 84.0 (81.64) 77.0 (82.2) 23.0 (88.56)
0.8 61.0 (95.31) 80.0 (92.64) 82.0 (90.66) 76.0 (91.56) 23.0 (100.71)
0.9 60.0 (107.81) 80.0 (104.5) 82.0 (102.54) 76.0 (103.71) 29.0 (115.26)
1.0 60.0 (114.66) 80.0 (111.05) 83.0 (109.05) 76.0 (110.38) 29.0 (122.64)
Table 8. Median and standard deviation for the number of unmatched
students, varying γ from 0.0 to 1.0 (Case 2)
Case 2: Students may be unacceptable.
